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The paper analyzes the choice of organizational structure as solution to the
trade-off between controlling behavior based on authority rights and mini-
mizing costs for implementing high efforts. The analysis includes the owner
of a firm, a top manager and two division heads. If it is more expensive to
incentivize the division heads, the owner will prefer full delegation of author-
ity to them to replace their high incentive pay by incentives based on private
benefits of control. In that situation, decentralization is optimal given that
selfish behavior is more important than cooperation for maximizing returns,
but concentrated delegation of full authority to a single division head is op-
timal for cooperation being crucial. If, however, incentivizing the division
heads is clearly less expensive than creating incentives for the top manager,
the owner will choose centralization given that cooperation is the dominating
issue, but partial delegation if selfish behavior is crucial.
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1 Introduction
In many environments, hierarchies have evolved as optimal organizational
form to deal with complex tasks (e.g., Chandler 1977, Williamson 1981).
Complexity of tasks arises from the division of labor within the corporation
and from complementarities between the organizational units. Concerning
economic activities, we can observe large corporations that are controlled
by a central decision maker at the top (e.g., the CEO). This top manager
determines the business strategy of the corporation and exerts effort that in-
fluences the performance of all organizational units at lower hierarchy levels.
Given such raw form of a hierarchy, the fundamental question then is how
should authority rights be allocated between the top manager and the orga-
nizational units to create the best organizational structure? In this paper, I
will give an answer from incentive perspective. I consider a stylized hierarchy
model with four players – the owner of the corporation, who chooses optimal
incentive contracts for the three other players and decides on the allocation
of authority rights, two division heads, who choose efforts to increase the
success probability of their organizational units or divisions, and the top
manager whose effort choice influences the performance of both divisions.
The model allows for externalities between the two divisions. If one divi-
sion is successful and behaves cooperatively, this success will also contribute
to the returns of the other division. For example, suppose that one division
produces certain goods and the other division sells these goods. On the one
hand, the production department’s decision which technology to use (e.g.,
applying a standard or an innovative production technique) influences the
timing, quality and degree of diversity of produced output, which influences
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the success of the sales division. On the other hand, the sales division’s
choice of distributive channels influences both own sales and the internal de-
mand for output from the production department. Similar externalities can
arise between two divisions if one division produces an intermediate good or
service that is used by the other division for producing a consumer good and
selling it to customers.
This paper combines the organizational-design setting of Choe and Ishig-
uro (2012) with the moral-hazard limited-liability approach to analyze two
kinds of incentives. First, following Choe and Ishiguro (2012), I assume that
players receive private benefits of control from having decision authority over
a division, which incentivizes the players as their private benefits increase in
the performance of the division. Second, inspired by Che and Yoo (2001),
Laffont and Martimort (2002), Hermalin (2005), and Schmitz (2005a, 2013),
among others, I use a binary-effort moral-hazard model with limited liability
to solve for the optimal incentive contracts for the top manager and the two
division heads. This setting has the big advantage that it allows to derive the
optimal incentive scheme without restricting the class of feasible contracts.
As in the paper by Choe and Ishiguro, there are six possible allocations of
authority rights leading to six different organizational structures. (1) If the
top manager receives the decision rights for both divisions, we will obtain a
centralized organization. (2) Alternatively, all decision rights can be given
to one of the division heads, leading to concentrated delegation. (3) Hierar-
chical delegation arises if the top manager has decision authority over one
division whose head possesses the decision rights over the other division. (4)
We can speak of partial delegation, if one division head has authority over
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his own division but the top manager decides on the other division. (5) De-
centralization will exist, if each division head decides on his own division. (6)
If each division head has decision rights over the other division, respectively,
the organizational structure can be called cross-authority delegation.
I will show that the owner chooses the optimal organizational structure
against the background of two issues, which may be conflicting: On the one
hand, the allocation of authority influences the players’ decisions towards
more selfish or more cooperative behavior, respectively. For example, under
decentralization each division head solely cares for his own division, which
fosters selfish behavior and works against cooperation. Thus, the owner has
to take into account whether cooperative or selfish behavior is more impor-
tant to maximize overall returns of the firm. On the other hand, allocating
decision authority to the top manager and/or the division heads provides
them with incentives, which do not directly lead to labor costs for the owner.
Consequently, the owner uses these incentives to replace incentives based on
pay for performance, which would imply positive labor costs.
The analysis of the optimal compensation shows that, under any organi-
zational structure, the owner cannot do better than paying the top manager
and the division heads on the basis of overall firm performance. For the top
manager the optimal contract is unique since his effort influences the perfor-
mance of both divisions, but for the division heads multiple contracts exist
that yield optimal incentives.
If it is more difficult to motivate the division heads than the manager
(i.e., the division heads’ costs from exerting high effort are larger than those
of the manager), explicit pay for performance for incentivizing the division
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heads would be quite high. In this situation, the owner prefers delegation of
authority to the division heads to replace their monetary incentives by incen-
tives based on private benefits of control. Decentralization will be optimal
if selfish behavior of the two divisions is more important than cooperation
for maximizing firm returns. If, however, cooperative behavior is crucial for
maximizing returns, it will be optimal to give one player full decision author-
ity so that he pays attention to the whole firm. Since, in the given situation,
saving of explicit incentive pay for the division heads is of main interest for
the owner, full authority should be given to one of the division heads, leading
to concentrated delegation as optimal structure.
If it is more costly to incentivize the manager, either centralization or
partial delegation will be optimal, because these two structures allow to
replace monetary incentives for the manager by incentives based on private
benefits of control. Centralization will be optimal if cooperative behavior
is important to maximize returns, since under centralization the manager
has full authority and, thus, cares about the whole firm. If, however, selfish
behavior is crucial for high returns, the owner will choose partial delegation
as optimal organizational structure.
Cross-authority delegation and hierarchical delegation are never optimal
from an incentive perspective. Under these two structures, players get au-
thority over a division whose performance cannot be influenced by their effort
choices. Thus, players receive an additional utility from private benefits of
control, but this utility solely increases their already positive rents without
benefiting the owner.
The following table roughly summarizes the main findings on the optimal
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organizational structure:
selfish behavior
important
cooperation
important
more costly
to incentivize
division heads
decentralization
concentrated
delegation
more costly
to incentivize
manager
partial
delegation
centralization
The paper is related to two strands of the literature. First, there are par-
allels to the literature on organizational design and the allocation of authority
rights in organizations. The seminal paper by Aghion and Tirole (1997) in-
troduces delegation of authority to subordinate managers as an incentive
device. Aghion et al. (2002) investigate in a partial-contracting setting how
delegation of authority is optimally used for inducing cooperative behavior.
Bester and Kra¨hmer (2008) discuss a moral-hazard model with limited li-
ability and investigate the interplay of authority and incentives. However,
they consider only one agent so that the choice between different organiza-
tional structures is not an issue. Jost and Rohlfing-Bastian (2013) analyze
a moral-hazard limited-liability framework in which a firm owner can either
delegate the right to coordinate tasks to one of two agents (decentralization)
or keep the decision authority (centralization). They show under which con-
ditions the two organizational structures are optimal for incentive reasons.
Thiele (2013) analyzes how decentralization and centralization can solve the
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trade-off between more accurate information from subjective performance
evaluation and possible collusion between the agents at lower tiers of the
hierarchy. Here, centralization refers to a situation in which the principal
evaluates the agents, whereas decentralization leads to the delegation of the
evaluation task to a supervisor.
As indicated above, my paper is most closely related to Choe and Ishiguro
(2012). They address the same six organizational structures and investigate
which organization is optimal from the owner’s point of view. However, in
the model by Choe and Ishiguro, the manager’s and division heads’ incentives
are exclusively exogenous. On the one hand, players have incentives based on
private benefits of control from received decision authority, as in my paper.
On the other hand, the manager is motivated by intrinsic concerns for firm
success, whereas the division heads have intrinsic concerns for their respective
divisions. In my paper, I show that replacing intrinsic motivation by optimal
incentive contracts yields a new effect – namely, the allocation of authority
rights as a means of substituting pay for performance by incentives from hav-
ing authority. This new effect leads to completely different results compared
to Choe and Ishiguro (2012). In particular, cross-authority delegation and
hierarchical delegation can be optimal in the setting of Choe and Ishiguro
(2012) but are never optimal in my model, whereas concentrated delegation
can be optimal in my model, which can never be the case in Choe and Ishig-
uro (2012). Moreover, in the model by Choe and Ishiguro, centralization
(decentralization) will be optimal if it is less (more) costly to motivate the
top manager than the two division heads. These findings are just reversed
in my setting due to the substitution effect explained before. Since both
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alternatives – intrinsic motivation and optimal endogenous incentives based
on division performance – seem realistic, my analysis complements the one
by Choe and Ishiguro by pointing to an important new effect under optimal
contracts.
The second strand of related literature belongs to the principal-agent the-
ory and analyzes optimal contracts under moral hazard and limited liability.
In that case, the principal typically has to leave a positive rent to the agent
when creating incentives. If incentives based on private benefits of control
have to be supplemented by monetary incentives, the same contractual fric-
tion can also be observed in my model. Limited liability has been introduced
as contractual friction by the seminal paper of Sappington (1983) and later
used by many others to address incentive problems under moral hazard (e.g.,
Innes 1990, Demougin and Fluet 1998, Schmitz 2005a, 2005b, Ohlendorf and
Schmitz 2012, Kra¨kel and Scho¨ttner 2012). Within this class of models, my
paper is closest to Schmitz (2013), who also uses a binary effort approach
and looks for optimal incentives to implement high effort. Contrary to my
paper, Schmitz (2013) does not consider the allocation of authority within
organizations and the corresponding optimal contract. He analyzes two se-
quential production stages which are conflicting and for which the principal
can hire either one agent or two agents.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model.
In Section 3, I derive the optimal contracts for the manager and the two di-
vision heads. Section 4 describes the different organizational structures. Sec-
tion 5 compares the expected profits and presents the optimal organizational
structure for the different parameter constellations. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model
The following model combines the organizational design set-up of Choe and
Ishiguro (2012) with the binary-effort approach that is often used to discuss
moral-hazard problems in principal-agent models under limited liability (e.g.,
Schmitz 2013). I consider a firm that consists of four risk neutral parties – an
owner O, a manager M , and two division heads A and B. Owner O decides
on the organizational structure of the firm and chooses incentive contracts for
the three other parties. Manager M exerts effort eM ∈ {0, 1} which leads to
effort costs k · eM with k > 0. Division head i (i = A,B) also chooses effort,
denoted by ei ∈ {0, 1} leading to costs c · ei with c > 0. The three effort
choices influence the performance of the two divisions and, hence, overall firm
performance. As the usual tie-breaking rule I assume that, if an individual
is indifferent between low and high effort, he will choose high effort.
Division i (i = A,B) is successful with probability Pi ≡ Pi(ei + eM) ∈
(0, 1) and fails with probability 1− Pi(ei + eM). Hence, manager M ’s effort
choice influences both divisions. For example, if M spends effort to improve
overall firm reputation this will help both divisions in selling their products.
To compute explicit solutions, I assume that each positive effort level ei = 1
or eM = 1 adds the probability mass ρ > 0 to the success probability of
division i whereas zero effort adds zero probability to Pi:
Pi (ei, eM) =

2ρ if ei + eM = 2
ρ if ei + eM = 1
0 if ei + eM = 0
with 2ρ < 1. We have a moral-hazard problem since the owner can observe
the success of each division, which is also contractible, but does not observe
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the effort choices of the three other parties.
As Choe and Ishiguro (2012), I assume that the divisions are intercon-
nected so that the success of one division also contributes to the returns of
the other division. In particular, if division A succeeds, this will yield re-
turns h (a) for division A and q (a) for division B. Similarly, if division B is
successful, this outcome will increase the returns of division B by h (b) and
the returns of division A by q (b). If a division fails, this will contribute zero
returns to either division. As indicated by the notation, the specific returns
depend on the endogenous decisions (a, b) with a ∈ {Sˆ, Cˆ} and b ∈ {Sˆ, Cˆ}.
As will become clear from the following, ”Sˆ” stands for selfish behavior and
”Cˆ” for cooperative behavior. In addition to the specific returns introduced
before, h (·) and q (·), each successful division yields basic returns R > 0 that
directly accrue to owner O.
The decision rights on a and b are allocated by the owner O to the three
other parties. For example, division head A may obtain authority on a
and division head B on b so that we have decentralization as organizational
structure, or all decision rights may be allocated to manager M leading to a
centralized organization. Let the allocation of decision authority be denoted
by ∆ := {χMj, χAj, χBj}j=A,B. The indicator variable χiA (χiB) takes the
value 1 if player i has decision authority over division A (division B) and,
hence, chooses a (b). However, χiA (χiB) takes the value 0 if player i is not
allowed to choose a (b).
To simplify matters, I follow Choe and Ishiguro (2012, p. 493) by as-
suming that q(Cˆ) := q > q(Sˆ) = 0 and h(Sˆ) := h > h(Cˆ) = 0. Hence, if a
division is successful, selfish behavior by the authorized decision maker will
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add positive returns h to this division, but zero returns to the other division.
However, cooperative behavior increases the returns of the other division by
q but adds zero returns to the division for which the decision maker is re-
sponsible. Altogether, given efforts e = (eM , eA, eB), the expected specific
returns of division A sum up to
E[piA|e] = PA · h(a) + PB · q(b)
and those of division B to
E[piB|e] = PB · h(b) + PA · q(a).
Following Choe and Ishiguro (2012), I assume that a party receives pri-
vate benefits of control from having decision authority over a division, which
is parameterized by λ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, i’s (i = A,B,M) expected payoff from
private benefits of control are given by λ ·∑j=A,B χijE[pij|e]. Note that, ac-
cording to Choe and Ishiguro (2012), the parameter λ is used to express a
party’s utility from having decision authority. It is not a sharing parameter
which would imply that only the remaining part of the expected specific re-
turns goes to the owner. Contrary to Choe and Ishiguro (2012) but in line
with Schmitz (2013), I assume that the owner can choose incentive contracts
for the three other parties based on the contractible success of the two di-
visions. Let wi = (wi11, w
i
10, w
i
01, w
i
00) denote the wage schedule that owner
O offers to player i (i = A,B,M) where wi11 (w
i
00) represents the payment
to i if both divisions succeed (fail), wi10 the payment if division A succeeds
and division B fails, and wi01 the payment if division A fails and division
B succeeds. Finally, I assume that player i (i = A,B,M) is protected by
limited liability in terms of wi11, w
i
10, w
i
01, w
i
00 ≥ 0, and that his reservation
value is standardized to zero.
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To summarize, manager M maximizes expected utility
EUM (eM |eA, eB) = PAPBwM11 + PA (1− PB)wM10 + (1− PA)PBwM01
+ (1− PA) (1− PB)wM00 + λ ·
∑
j=A,B
χMjE[pij|e]− k · eM ,
and division head A
EUA (eA|eM , eB) = PAPBwA11 + PA (1− PB)wA10 + (1− PA)PBwA01
+ (1− PA) (1− PB)wA00 + λ ·
∑
j=A,B
χAjE[pij|e]− c · eA.
The objective function of B, denoted by EUB (eB|eM , eA), is derived analo-
gously to EUA (eA|eM , eB). Owner O maximizes expected profits
pi =
∑
j=A,B
E[pij|e] + PAPB
(
2R−
∑
i=A,B,M
wi11
)
+ PA (1− PB)
(
R−
∑
i=A,B,M
wi10
)
+ (1− PA)PB
(
R−
∑
i=A,B,M
wi01
)
− (1− PA) (1− PB)
∑
i=A,B,M
wi00. (1)
I follow Laffont and Martimort (2002, p. 155) and Schmitz (2005a, p. 322;
2013, p. 110), among many others, and assume that the basic return R
is sufficiently large so that O always wants to implement high efforts eA =
eB = eM = 1. By this simplifying assumption I can skip the analysis of
all the remaining effort combinations, which would lead to many additional
computations without leading to really new insights.
The timing of events is the following: First, owner O chooses an allocation
of decision rights, ∆, and offers contracts wi (i = A,B,M) to the three other
parties. Thereafter, A, B and M decide whether to accept or reject the
respective contract. If they accept, they will simultaneously choose efforts
ei (i = A,B,M) and decisions (a, b) to maximize their objective functions.
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Finally, nature decides on the success of the two divisions and payoffs are
realized.
3 Optimal Contracts
At any stage of the game, all players know that, for given ∆, the authorized
decision makers will choose (a, b) to maximize their respective objective func-
tions. These decisions are anticipated by owner O at the beginning of the
game. Since he always wants to implement high efforts, we can directly solve
for the optimal contracts wi∗ (i = A,B,M) that implement ei = 1 at lowest
expected labor costs for any given allocation of authority. Note that due
to the limited-liability constraints, which guarantee non-negative wages, we
can ignore the participation constraints of players A, B and M : since each
player has a zero reservation value and zero cost from choosing zero effort
each feasible contract that satisfies the limited-liability constraints will be
accepted.
In the following, we have to look for those contracts under which eA =
eB = eM = 1 is a Nash equilibrium. Manager M ’s expected utility for
eA = eB = eM = 1 is given by EUM (1|1, 1). If M deviates to eM = 0, his
expected utility will be EUM (0|1, 1). Hence, M will not deviate from high
effort if EUM (1|1, 1) ≥ EUM (0|1, 1). Similarly, we must have EUA (1|1, 1) ≥
EUA (0|1, 1) and EUB (1|1, 1) ≥ EUB (0|1, 1) so that players A and B do not
deviate from high effort either. Altogether, owner O minimizes expected
labor costs for implementing high efforts ei = 1 subject to the three Nash
equilibrium conditions EUi (1|1, 1) ≥ EUi (0|1, 1) (i = A,B,M). The cor-
responding wages describe the optimal contracts wi∗ = (wi∗11, w
i∗
10, w
i∗
01, w
i∗
00)
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(i = A,B,M) that are chosen by O at the first stage of the game:
Proposition 1 Let ΛM := λ[χMA (h (a) + q (b)) + χMB (h (b) + q (a))],
ΛA := λ[χAAh (a) + χABq (a)], and ΛB := λ[χBAq (b) + χBBh (b)].
(a) If ΛM ≥ k/ρ, then contract wM∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0) will be optimal; other-
wise, O optimally chooses wM∗ = (wM∗11 , 0, 0, 0) with
wM∗11 =
k
3ρ2
− ΛM
3ρ
. (2)
(b) If ΛA ≥ c/ρ, then contract wA∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0) will be optimal; otherwise
O optimally chooses wA∗ = (wA∗11 , w
A∗
10 , 0, 0) with
2ρwA∗11 + (1− 2ρ)wA∗10 =
c
ρ
− ΛA. (3)
(c) If ΛB ≥ c/ρ, then contract wB∗ = (0, 0, 0, 0) will be optimal; otherwise
O optimally chooses wB∗ = (wB∗11 , 0, w
B∗
01 , 0) with
2ρwB∗11 + (1− 2ρ)wB∗01 =
c
ρ
− ΛB. (4)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Whether owner O induces incentives for A, B and M by offering positive
wages in case of success, crucially depends on the magnitude of the already
existing incentives based on private benefits of control, described by ρΛi
(i = A,B,M). Hence, if ρΛi exceeds player i’s additional effort costs for
choosing high instead of low effort, then i is sufficiently motivated without
any additional wage premium so thatO optimally saves labor costs by offering
zero wages for any event. However, if incentives based on private benefits
of control are not large enough – in particular, if a player has not received
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any authority – then owner O must counterbalance missing motivation by
offering sufficiently large wage premiums. As is shown by the right-hand sides
of (2), (3) and (4), for each of the three players A, B and M it holds that
the larger the already existing incentives based on private benefits of control
the lower will be optimal expected wages because both kinds of incentives
are substitutes in the Nash equilibrium conditions.
If the owner has to offer supplementary monetary incentives, the optimal
contract for manager M will be unique: since M positively contributes to
the performance of both divisions in the same way, he will only obtain a
positive wage if both divisions are successful. If division heads A and B
have to be incentivized via wages, the respectively optimal contract will not
be unique. The effort choice of division head i (i = A,B) only influences
the success of his own division, but this success contributes to overall firm
success. Thus, the performance of i’s division or overall firm performance
or a combination of both can be used as alternative instruments to create
incentives for division head i.
The results of Proposition 1 imply that if owner O has to offer positive
wages, he can restrict his choice of optimal contracts to those with wi∗11 > 0
and wi∗10 = w
i∗
01 = w
i∗
00 = 0 (i = A,B,M):
Corollary 1 If the owner has to induce incentives via wages, contracts based
on overall firm performance with
wM∗11 =
k
3ρ2
− ΛM
3ρ
and wj∗11 =
c
2ρ2
− Λj
2ρ
(j = A,B)
and wi∗10 = w
i∗
01 = w
i∗
00 = 0 (i = A,B,M) at least weakly dominate all other
contracts.
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The result of Corollary 1 highlights an important difference to Choe and
Ishiguro (2012). In their paper, Choe and Ishiguro consider two types of
incentives. First, players have exogenous incentives based on private bene-
fits of control. This assumption is identical to the one used in my paper.
The second kind of incentives in Choe and Ishiguro (2012) stems from in-
trinsic motivation of the players, which is also exogenously given. Intrinsic
motivation of division heads A and B depends on the success of their respec-
tive division, but the intrinsic motivation of manager M , who contributes
to the success of both divisions, depends on overall firm success (see Choe
and Ishiguro 2012, p. 492). In my paper, this second kind of incentives –
intrinsic motivation – is replaced by optimal endogenous incentives based
on contracts. Since I assume limited liability, players receive positive rents
in this paper as well as in Choe and Ishiguro (2012). However, the crucial
difference between both settings is that the allocation of decision rights can
be used in Choe and Ishiguro (2012) to align the interests of at most one
division head with the owner’s interests (and that of manager M), whereas
in my paper optimal contracts lead to aligned interests of all four parties O,
M , A and B. In the following, I will use the optimal contracts to solve for
the equilibrium allocation of authority and the corresponding organizational
structures.
4 Allocation of Decision Authority
At the first stage of the game, O has to decide on ∆ = {χMj, χAj, χBj}j=A,B,
which allocates decision authority over a and b among the players A, B and
M . In principle, there are 32 = 9 possible allocations. However, since the
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two divisions as well as their division heads A and B are identical we can skip
three allocations without restricting the scope of the analysis. The remaining
allocations and their corresponding organizational structures, as suggested
by Choe and Ishiguro (2012), are summarized in the following table:1
authority
over a
authority
over b
organizational structure
M M centralization (C)
A A concentrated delegation (CD)
M A hierarchical delegation (HD)
A M partial delegation (PD)
A B decentralization (D)
B A cross-authority delegation (CA)
The first (second) column contains the player that receives authority over a
(b) and the third column shows the corresponding organizational structure
with the respective abbreviation in parentheses. A centralized organizational
structure (C) arises if the hierarchically highest decision maker, manager
M , receives both decision rights. An organizational structure is defined as
concentrated delegation (CD) if both decision rights are allocated to a single
division head. We have a three-tier hierarchy, called hierarchical delegation
(HD), if manager M has decision authority over division A, and division
head A has decision authority over division B. Partial delegation (PD) is
given if division head A has authority over his own division but manager M
decides on division B. There is decentralization (D) if each division head
decides on his own division. Finally, it is possible that each division head
1The combination ”B,B” is skipped since it is similar to ”A,A”. In addition, I skip
”M,B” and ”B,M” because they are similar to ”M,A” and ”A,M”.
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has decision authority over the other division, respectively, which is called
cross-authority delegation (CA).
For these six organizational structures, optimal expected firm profits –
piC , piCD, piHD, piPDk>c, pi
PD
k<c, pi
D, and piCA – can be derived (see the Appendix).
The results show that cooperation will only be chosen if one player has full
decision authority over a and b, and cooperation is more important than self-
ish behavior for maximizing returns. Hence, under centralization, manager
M will choose cooperative behavior instead of selfish one if q > h, and in case
of concentrated delegation, division head A will prefer cooperative behavior
to selfish one if q > h. In all other cases, the players prefer to behave self-
ishly. In the next step, we can use pairwise comparisons of expected profits
to analyze which organizational structure is optimal under which conditions.
The following section will present the findings.
5 Optimal Organizational Structure
An immediate observation leads to the first result:
Proposition 2 Hierarchical delegation and cross-authority delegation are
never chosen by the owner.
Proof. Comparing piHD with piPDk>c and pi
PD
k<c immediately shows that
partial delegation always dominates hierarchical delegation, irrespective of
whether k > c or k < c. Expected profits piCA are lower than the expected
profits under any other organizational structure.
Cross-authority delegation is clearly dominated by all other organiza-
tional structures. Hierarchical delegation is also not optimal in economizing
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on implementation costs. The comparison with partial delegation shows
that, under both HD and PD, owner O can save implementation costs for
the manager M if private benefits of control are sufficiently large, but partial
delegation additionally saves costs from one of the division heads. If private
benefits of control are only moderate or rather small so that O either saves
implementation costs only for M or no costs at all under both organizational
structures, then partial delegation anyhow yields higher expected returns at
identical implementation costs compared to hierarchical delegation.
The intuition for the inferiority of hierarchical delegation and cross-authority
delegation is based on the fact that implementation costs will only be saved
if a player gets authority over a division that can be influenced by his own
effort choice. Otherwise, the player receives additional utility from authority,
but this utility solely increases his already positive rent without influencing
behavior. For this reason, cross-authority delegation is strictly inferior since
no player i (i = A,B,M) gets authority over an organizational unit whose
performance can be improved by i’s effort choice. Similarly, under hierarchi-
cal delegation, incentives are wasted for division head A, who has authority
over division B but cannot influence division B’s success probability.
The findings of Proposition 2 are in stark contrast to those in Choe and
Ishiguro (2012), where both hierarchical delegation and cross-authority dele-
gation can be optimal. Consider, for example, hierarchical delegation.2 Choe
and Ishiguro show that, if q is large, both decisions, a and b, will be coop-
erative and lead to higher profits the larger q. Consequently, hierarchical
delegation can be optimal in situations where the specific returns from co-
operative behavior (i.e., q) considerably exceed specific returns from selfish
2The following argumentation analogously holds for cross-authority delegation.
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behavior (i.e., h). Choe and Ishiguro conclude that ”hierarchical delegation
can emerge as an optimal organizational form when both coordination and
motivation are important” (Choe and Ishiguro 2012, p. 491).
In my setting with endogenous incentives and optimal contracts, however,
decisions are always selfish under hierarchical delegation. The objective func-
tions (5) and (8) in the Appendix show that, under χMA = χAB = 1 both
decision makers M and A prefer selfish behavior to maximize their private
benefits of control. Proposition 1 then points to a fundamental incentive
problem that arises under hierarchical delegation. As we know from above,
owner O profits from implicit incentives based on private benefits of control
if they replace explicit wage premiums. Under hierarchical delegation, A’s
implicit incentives from decision authority are given by
ρΛA = ρλ[χAAh (a) + χABq (a)].
Since χMA = χAB = 1 whereas all other indicator variables are zero and
since under purely selfish behavior we obtain h (a) = h > q (a) = 0, implicit
incentives of division head A are ρΛA = 0 – despite delegation. This finding
stems from the important fact that division head A is not responsible for his
own division so that no implicit incentives are generated.3
Note that the result on the inferiority of hierarchical delegation and cross-
authority delegation is also related to the incentive intensity principle of
Milgrom and Roberts (1992). According to this principle, the ”intensity of
3Technically, A receives the extra utility 2ρλ[χAB(h (b) + q (a))] = 2ρλh (b) from dele-
gation (see (8) in the Appendix), but A’s incentive constraint is independent of 2ρλh (b)
because he cannot influence the success of division B. Thus, A may obtain the private ben-
efits of control, λh (b), with positive probability, but this probability is PB (eB , eM ) = 2ρ
irrespective of whether A chooses eA = 1 or eA = 0.
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incentives should increase with the marginal productivity of effort and with
the agent’s ability to respond to incentives” (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, p.
599). Hierarchical delegation and cross-authority delegation do not work well
from an incentive perspective since division heads cannot respond with their
effort choices to increased authority.
The remaining four alternatives – centralization (C), concentrated del-
egation (CD), partial delegation (PD), and decentralization (D) – can be
optimal organizational structures for certain parameter constellations. If it
is more costly to incentivize the division heads than the manager, we will
obtain the following results:
Proposition 3 Let c > k.
(a) If the specific returns to selfish behavior exceed the specific returns to
cooperative behavior (i.e., h > q), then decentralization is the optimal
organizational structure.
(b) If cooperative behavior is more important than selfish behavior (i.e.,
h < q), the optimal organizational structure crucially depends on the
magnitude of q − h:
(i) Suppose 2
3
k ≤ λqρ. There exists a cut-off value q˜ so that concen-
trated delegation will be optimal iff q > q˜; otherwise decentraliza-
tion is optimal.
(ii) Suppose 2
3
k > λqρ. There exists a cut-off value h˜ so that cen-
tralization will be optimal iff h < h˜; otherwise decentralization is
optimal.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Result (a) of Proposition 3 can be explained as follows. Recall that the
compensation of A, B and M for exerting high effort consists of private bene-
fits of control – which are for free for owner O – and of explicit wage payments
– which directly increase O’s labor costs. The higher a player’s private ben-
efits of control the lower are O’s labor costs for this player and vice versa. If
it is more costly to incentivize a division head than the manager (i.e., c > k),
it will be profitable for O to avoid explicit wage payments to the division
heads by giving decision authority and, hence, private benefits of control to
them. Decentralization is the only organization where both decision heads
get implicit incentives via delegated decision rights. As a consequence, O
can reduce his labor costs considerably under this organizational structure
since in many situations he only has to pay the rather moderate wage wM∗11
to manager M without paying anything else to A and B. If, in addition,
selfish behavior is more important than cooperative behavior (h > q), decen-
tralization will be always optimal since division heads prefer selfish behavior
under decentralization.
If cooperative behavior is more important than selfish behavior for maxi-
mizing returns (h < q), either centralization or concentrated delegation may
become optimal (result (b) of Proposition 3) because under these two organi-
zational forms the player that gets full decision authority chooses cooperation
in the given situation. However, in case of centralization neither division head
gets implicit incentives and under concentrated delegation only one division
head is incentivized via delegated authority. As c > k still favors the dele-
gation of decision rights to division heads for saving implementation costs,
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now two opposing effects exist for the owner – realizing high specific returns
q versus saving high implementation costs for two (instead of one) division
heads. As a consequence, the optimal organizational structure now depends
on an additional parameter condition.
Suppose the owner’s costs of creating monetary incentives for the manager
are quite large relative to specific returns from cooperation (i.e., 2
3
k > λqρ).
Then, ensuring returns from cooperation and, at the same time, saving im-
plementation costs for the manager will be the best solution to the trade-off
described in the previous paragraph. This intuition explains result (b)(ii) of
Proposition 3. If, as in result (b)(i), savings from replacing M ’s monetary
incentives by implicit ones via delegated authority are small relative to the
returns from cooperation (i.e., 2
3
k ≤ λqρ), the owner will prefer concentrated
delegation. In that case, he ensures specific returns from cooperation and
saves implementation costs for one division head. However, if returns from
cooperation are not sufficiently large and/or returns from selfish behavior are
not sufficiently small, the owner will still choose decentralization as optimal
organization in spite of h < q.
The next result deals with situations in which it is quite costly for the
owner to incentivize the manager and in which the specific returns to selfish
behavior exceed the specific returns to cooperative behavior:
Proposition 4 Let c < k and h > q. If c > min{2
3
k, 2
3
λhρ}, then decen-
tralization will be optimal. If 2
3
k − 2
3
λhρ < c < min{2
3
k, 2
3
λhρ}, then partial
delegation will be optimal. For the remaining parameter values centralization
is optimal.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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The proposition shows that if the costs of inducing high effort to the man-
ager and the division heads do not differ very much (i.e., c > min{2
3
k, 2
3
λhρ}),
the owner’s organizational choice will be the same as in Proposition 3(a) with
c > k: he prefers decentralization to save implementation costs of the divi-
sion heads and to ensure selfish behavior. If, however, the division heads’
effort costs c take lower values, it will be optimal for the owner to save costs
for incentivizing the manager. The owner, therefore, prefers either partial
delegation or centralization. Under either organizational form the manager
gets implicit incentives via delegated authority. If c is of moderate size (i.e.,
2
3
k− 2
3
λhρ < c < min{2
3
k, 2
3
λhρ}), it is optimal to save implementation costs
for the manager and one division head by using partial delegation. If c is
small – and k is large –, it will be optimal to give the manager full decision
authority to reduce implementation costs for his effort choice considerably.
The owner chooses centralization in that situation which gives the manager
authority over both divisions and, hence, doubles the respective cost reduc-
tion.
The results of Proposition 3(a) and Proposition 4 describe the optimal
organizational form if selfish behavior is more important than cooperation
for maximizing overall returns. Figure 1 summarizes these findings. We can
see that only three of the four organizational alternatives can be optimal for
h > q. If it is sufficiently expensive for the owner to motivate the division
heads, decentralization will be optimal to give each division head authority
rights and thus implicit incentives. If, however, it is more costly to incentivize
the manager, the owner will prefer either partial delegation or centralization.
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Figure 1: Optimal organizational structure for h > q
Now, I consider the remaining parameter constellations with h < q and
c < k. The comparison of expected profits leads to the results of Proposition
5:
Proposition 5 Let c < k and h < q.
(a) Suppose c < 2
3
k. If q − h is sufficiently large, centralization will be
optimal.
(b) Suppose c ≥ 2
3
k. If q − h is sufficiently large, concentrated delegation
will be optimal.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that if the specific returns to cooperative behavior
sufficiently exceed those to selfish behavior, only centralization or concen-
trated delegation can be optimal. Both organizational forms ensure coop-
erative behavior of the players, which is of major interest for the owner in
the given situation. Saving implementation costs again is the owner’s second
aim. If the costs for motivating the manager are large (i.e., c < 2
3
k), the
owner will give full decision authority to the manager by using centraliza-
tion. If, however, motivating the division heads is more costly (i.e., c ≥ 2
3
k),
the owner will delegate full decision authority to one of the decision heads
via concentrated delegation.
Figure 2 captures the complete results for h < q. Different to the case
of h > q, now the exact look of the figure crucially depends on the concrete
values of the parameters although the results of Proposition 3(b) and Propo-
sition 5 already describe some general findings. The reason for the difference
to Figure 1 stems from the fact that players always chooses selfish behavior
under h > q so that the value of q is irrelevant for Figure 1. For the situation
with h < q, however, the values of both h and q are important for the choice
of the optimal organization since players choose selfish behavior in case of
decentralization and partial delegation, but cooperative behavior under cen-
tralization and concentrated delegation. For the construction of Figure 2, I
use λ = ρ = 1/2 and λhρ = 3
4
k, implying h = 3k.4
Figure 2 confirms the findings of Proposition 5 that, for q − h being
sufficiently large, centralization (concentrated delegation) will be optimal if
4See the additional material for the referees on a detailed description of how Figure 2
can be obtained.
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Figure 2: Optimal organizational structure for h < q
c < 2
3
k (c ≥ 2
3
k). If q−h takes lower values, partial delegation or decentraliza-
tion can be optimal although cooperative behavior maximizes overall returns
but players choose selfish behavior under the two organizational forms. This
observation can be explained by the fact that h = 3k in Figure 2. Thus, even
selfish behavior leads to some specific returns, which makes partial delega-
tion and decentralization attractive for the owner. Suppose, on the contrary,
that h → 0. In that extreme case, the organizational forms ”partial delega-
tion” and ”decentralization” would completely disappear in Figure 2, because
specific returns and saved implementation costs would both be zero.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the optimal organizational structure of a corporation
that consists of an owner, a top manager, and two divisions with correspond-
ing division heads. There exist possible externalities between the divisions:
if a division behaves cooperatively, the division’s success will increase the
performance of the other division. The owner of the corporation can control
the behavior of the top manager and the division heads by two instruments.
On the one hand, the owner can use optimal incentive contracts based on
the performance of the two divisions. This instrument determines the effort
choices of the top manager and the division heads. On the other hand, the
owner allocates decision authority over the two divisions to the three players.
The behavioral implications of this allocation are twofold: (1) the authorized
player is directed towards more selfish or more cooperative behavior, (2) the
allocation influences the players’ private benefits of control and, thus, their
incentives for choosing high efforts. The paper shows that the interplay of
these two effects determines the optimal organizational structure.
Four different structures can be optimal – decentralization, concentrated
delegation, centralization and partial delegation. Decentralization will be
optimal if selfish behavior is more important than cooperative behavior to
maximize firm profits and if it is more costly to incentivize division heads
than the top manager. If, however, cooperation is more important than
selfish behavior and motivating division heads is still more costly, then con-
centrated delegation turns out to be optimal. If it is more costly to motivate
the top manager than the division heads, the two remaining organizational
structures can be optimal. Centralization is beneficial since the top manager,
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who has full decision authority, flexibly either chooses selfish or cooperative
behavior, depending on which one is more effective. However, centralization
has the drawback that private benefits of control can only reduce the owner’s
labor costs for the top manager. Partial delegation always leads to selfish be-
havior and, hence, is disadvantageous if cooperative behavior is considerably
more important than selfish behavior. However, compared to centralization,
partial delegation can reduce the labor costs for the top manager and one
division head, which is beneficial from the owner’s perspective.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We have
EUM (1|1, 1) = 4ρ2wM11 + 2ρ (1− 2ρ)
(
wM10 + w
M
01
)
+ (1− 2ρ)2wM00
+ 2ρλ [χMA (h (a) + q (b)) + χMB (h (b) + q (a))]− k, (5)
and, in case of deviation to low effort eM = 0,
EUM (0|1, 1) = ρ2wM11 + ρ (1− ρ)
(
wM10 + w
M
01
)
+ (1− ρ)2wM00
+ ρλ [χMA (h (a) + q (b)) + χMB (h (b) + q (a))] .
Condition EUM (1|1, 1) ≥ EUM (0|1, 1) can therefore be written as
3ρ2wM11 − ρ (3ρ− 1)
(
wM10 + w
M
01
)− ρ (2− 3ρ)wM00
+ρλ [χMA (h (a) + q (b)) + χMB (h (b) + q (a))] ≥ k. (6)
Owner O’s expected labor costs from inducing high effort to M are
4ρ2wM11 + 2ρ (1− 2ρ)
(
wM10 + w
M
01
)
+ (1− 2ρ)2wM00 . (7)
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There are two possibilities: if M has got decision rights for a and/or b and his
private benefits of control are sufficiently large so that ρλ[χMA (h (a) + q (b))+
χMB (h (b) + q (a))] ≥ k, then M ’s motivation is already large enough so that
O optimally chooses wM11 = w
M
10 = w
M
01 = w
M
00 = 0 to save labor costs; other-
wise, O will minimize (7) subject to (6). Obviously, wM00 = 0 is optimal. In
addition, without loss of generality, we can set wM01 = 0. Thus, the problem
reduces to
min
wM11 ,w
M
10
4ρ2wM11 + 2ρ (1− 2ρ)wM10 subject to
3ρwM11 − (3ρ− 1)wM10 + ΛM ≥
k
ρ
with ΛM := λ [χMA (h (a) + q (b)) + χMB (h (b) + q (a))]. If ρ ≥ 1/3, then
wM10 = 0 and w
M
11 =
k
3ρ2
− ΛM
3ρ
are optimal; otherwise – that is, ρ < 1/3 –
owner O optimally chooses from the iso-cost curves with costs CM that are
described by
wM10 =
CM
2ρ (1− 2ρ) −
2ρ
1− 2ρw
M
11
the one that corresponds to the lowest possible costs CM and, at the same
time, satisfies M ’s Nash equilibrium condition
wM10 ≥
k
ρ
− ΛM
1− 3ρ −
3ρ
1− 3ρw
M
11 .
Since the absolute value of the slope of the iso-cost curves is smaller than the
absolute value of the slope of the Nash equilibrium condition – i.e., 2ρ
1−2ρ <
3ρ
1−3ρ – it is again optimal for O to choose w
M
10 = 0 and w
M
11 =
k
3ρ2
− ΛM
3ρ
.
Given eA = eB = eM = 1, player A’s expected utility amounts to
EUA (1|1, 1) = 4ρ2wA11 + 2ρ (1− 2ρ)
(
wA10 + w
A
01
)
+ (1− 2ρ)2wA0.0
+ 2ρλ [χAA (h (a) + q (b)) + χAB (h (b) + q (a))]− c (8)
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Deviating to low effort leads to
EUA (0|1, 1) = 2ρ2wA11 + ρ (1− 2ρ)wA10 + 2ρ (1− ρ)wA01 + (1− ρ) (1− 2ρ)wA00
+ λ [χAA (ρh (a) + 2ρq (b)) + χAB (2ρh (b) + ρq (a))] .
Therefore, A will not deviate to low effort if
2ρ2
(
wA11 − wA01
)
+ ρ (1− 2ρ) (wA10 − wA00)+ ρλ [χAAh (a) + χABq (a)] ≥ c.
Since O wants to minimize expected labor costs
4ρ2wA11 + 2ρ (1− 2ρ)
(
wA10 + w
A
01
)
+ (1− 2ρ)2wA00,
he optimally chooses wA00 = w
A
01 = 0. The cost minimization problem thus
boils down to
min
wA11,w
A
10
4ρ2wA11 + 2ρ (1− 2ρ)wA10 subject to
2ρ2wA11 + ρ (1− 2ρ)wA10 + ρλ [χAAh (a) + χABq (a)] ≥ c. (9)
Again, if private benefits of control are sufficiently large –, i.e., ρλ[χAAh (a)+
χABq (a)] ≥ c – then the choice of wA11 = wA10 = 0 is optimal. Otherwise, O
minimizes costs by minimizing 2ρwA11 +(1− 2ρ)wA10 subject to (9). Thus, the
best O can do is to choose wA11 and w
A
10 so that (9) becomes binding. Optimal
wages wA11 and w
A
10 are therefore described by
2ρwA11 + (1− 2ρ)wA10 =
c
ρ
− ΛA
with ΛA := λ [χAAh (a) + χABq (a)].
Analogous results can be found for player B: optimal is always wB00 =
wB10 = 0. If λρ[χBAq (b) + χBBh (b)] ≥ c, then wB11 = wB01 = 0 is optimal;
otherwise optimal incentives for B are described by
2ρwB11 + (1− 2ρ)wB01 =
c
ρ
− ΛB
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with ΛB = λ[χBAq (b) + χBBh (b)].
Optimal compensation and expected firm profits:
Under centralization, we have χMA = χMB = 1 whereas the other indicator
variables are zero. According to his objective function (5), for given wages,
manager M will choose a, b = Sˆ if h > q, and a, b = Cˆ if h < q. From
Proposition 1, we know that his compensation will be
wM∗11 =

0 if h > q and 2λh ≥ k
ρ
0 if h < q and 2λq ≥ k
ρ
k
3ρ2
− 2λh
3ρ
if h > q and 2λh < k
ρ
k
3ρ2
− 2λq
3ρ
if h < q and 2λq < k
ρ
Since the two division heads have zero authority, they must be fully compen-
sated via explicit incentive pay. From Corollary 1 we obtain wA∗11 =
c
2ρ2
and
wB∗11 =
c
2ρ2
. According to (1), owner O’s expected profits with a centralized
organization are
piC =

4 (Rρ+ hρ− c) if h > q and 2λh ≥ k
ρ
4 (Rρ+ qρ− c) if h < q and 2λq ≥ k
ρ
4Rρ+
(
4 + 8
3
λ
)
hρ− 4c− 4
3
k if h > q and 2λh < k
ρ
4Rρ+
(
4 + 8
3
λ
)
qρ− 4c− 4
3
k if h < q and 2λq < k
ρ
.
If the owner has chosen concentrated delegation, division head A has full
decision authority so that χAA = χAB = 1. From (8) it follows that, for
given wages, he will choose a, b = Sˆ if h > q, and a, b = Cˆ if h < q. His
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compensation is therefore
wA∗11 =

0 if h > q and λh ≥ c
ρ
0 if h < q and λq ≥ c
ρ
c
2ρ2
− λh
2ρ
if h > q and λh < c
ρ
c
2ρ2
− λq
2ρ
if h < q and λq < c
ρ
.
Players B and M do not have any authority and must be fully compensated
via wB∗11 > 0 and w
M∗
11 > 0. Corollary 1 yields w
B∗
11 =
c
2ρ2
and wM∗11 =
k
3ρ2
.
Owner O’s expected profits are
piCD =

4Rρ+ 4hρ− 2c− 4
3
k if h > q and λh ≥ c
ρ
4Rρ+ 4qρ− 2c− 4
3
k if h < q and λq ≥ c
ρ
4Rρ+ (4 + 2λ)hρ− 4c− 4
3
k if h > q and λh < c
ρ
4Rρ+ (4 + 2λ) qρ− 4c− 4
3
k if h < q and λq < c
ρ
.
In case of hierarchical delegation, M has authority over division A (i.e.,
χMA = 1) and chooses a = Sˆ to maximize (5), implying h (a) = h and q (a) =
0. Player A has authority over division B (that is, χAB = 1). According to
(8), for given wages, he chooses b = Sˆ, implying h (b) = h and q (b) = 0.
Hence, M ’s compensation is given by
wM∗11 =
 0 if λh ≥
k
ρ
k
3ρ2
− λh
3ρ
if λh < k
ρ
,
whereas the two division heads receive wages wA∗11 = w
B∗
11 =
c
2ρ2
.5 Owner O’s
expected profits can be written as
piHD =
 4 (Rρ+ hρ− c) if λh ≥
k
ρ
4Rρ+
(
4 + 4
3
λ
)
hρ− 4c− 4
3
k if λh < k
ρ
.
5Note that A has authority over division B (i.e., χAB = 1), but q (a) = 0 so that player
A does not have incentives from delegated authority.
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Partial delegation is characterized by χAA = χMB = 1. (5) and (8) show
that M optimally chooses b = Sˆ, which implies h (b) = h and q (b) = 0, and
A chooses a = Sˆ, implying h (a) = h and q (a) = 0. The corresponding wages
are therefore
wM∗11 =
 0 if λh ≥
k
ρ
k
3ρ2
− λh
3ρ
if λh < k
ρ
and wA∗11 =
 0 if λh ≥
c
ρ
c
2ρ2
− λh
2ρ
if λh < c
ρ
,
whereas B is offered wage wB∗11 =
c
2ρ2
. Owner O’s expected profits crucially
depend on the relation of M ’s and A’s effort costs. If k > c, then
piPDk>c =

4Rρ+
(
4 + 10
3
λ
)
hρ− 4c− 4
3
k if λh < c
ρ
4Rρ+
(
4 + 4
3
λ
)
hρ− 2c− 4
3
k if c
ρ
≤ λh < k
ρ
4Rρ+ 4hρ− 2c if k
ρ
≤ λh,
but if k < c, then
piPDk<c =

4Rρ+
(
4 + 10
3
λ
)
hρ− 4c− 4
3
k if λh < k
ρ
4Rρ+ (4 + 2λ)hρ− 4c if k
ρ
≤ λh < c
ρ
4Rρ+ 4hρ− 2c if c
ρ
≤ λh.
Not surprisingly, in case of decentralization (χAA = χBB = 1), both
division heads behave selfishly: a = b = Sˆ, which implies h (a) = h (b) = h
and q (a) = q (b) = 0. The division heads’ wages are thus
wA∗11 = w
B∗
11 =
 0 if λh ≥
c
ρ
c
2ρ2
− λh
2ρ
if λh < c
ρ
,
and manager M obtains wM∗11 =
k
3ρ2
, leading to expected profits
piD =
 4Rρ+ 4hρ−
4
3
k if λh ≥ c
ρ
4Rρ+ (4 + 4λ)hρ− 4c− 4
3
k if λh < c
ρ
,
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for owner O.
Under cross-authority delegation (χBA = χAB = 1), both division heads
prefer selfish behavior a = b = Sˆ, implying h (a) = h (b) = h and q (a) =
q (b) = 0. From Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, we obtain wM∗11 =
k
3ρ2
and
wA∗11 = w
B∗
11 =
c
2ρ2
, leading to profits piCA = 4Rρ+ 4hρ− 4c− 4
3
k.
Proof of Proposition 3:
To prove the proposition, I start with the following useful observation:
Lemma 1 If h > q, then piD > piCD.
Proof. If λh ≥ c
ρ
, then piD = piCD+2c. If λh < c
ρ
, then piD = piCD+2λhρ.
Next, the following observation can be proved:
Lemma 2 If c > k, then piD > piPDk<c.
Proof. If λh < k
ρ
, then piD > piPDk<c ⇔ 4λhρ > 103 λhρ, which is true. If
k
ρ
≤ λh < c
ρ
, then piD > piPDk<c ⇔ λh > 23 kρ , which is true. If cρ ≤ λh, then
piD > piPDk<c ⇔ c > 23k, which is true.
For h > q and c > k, straightforward calculations show that piD > piC ,
which completes the proof of result (a).
Now, consider result (b) with h < q and c > k. PD cannot be optimal due
to Lemma 2. The comparison of CD and C can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 3 Let h < q and c > k. There will be piCD > piC, iff λqρ ≥ 2
3
k.
Proof. If λq < k
2ρ
, then piC > piCD ⇔ 8
3
λqρ > 2λqρ is true. If k
2ρ
≤ λq <
c
ρ
, then piC > piCD ⇔ 2
3
k > λqρ. If λq ≥ c
ρ
, then piC > piCD ⇔ 2
3
k > c is false,
which completes the proof.
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According to Lemma 3, only CD or D can be optimal under λqρ ≥ 2
3
k.
Comparing profits leads to three possible cases: If λh < c/ρ and λq < c/ρ,
then piCD > piD ⇔ q > [(2 + 2λ)h]/ (2 + λ). If λh < c/ρ and λq ≥ c/ρ, then
piCD > piD ⇔ q > [(2 + 2λ)hρ − c]/ (2ρ). If λh ≥ c/ρ and λq ≥ c/ρ, then
piCD > piD ⇔ q > [2hρ + c]/ (2ρ). Altogether, if q is sufficiently large, CD
will be optimal; otherwise D is optimal.
In case of λqρ < 2
3
k, only C or D can be optimal (see Lemma 3). The
comparison of profits yields two different cases: If λhρ < λqρ < k/2, then
piC > piD ⇔ (1 + 2
3
λ)q > (1 + λ)h. If λhρ < λqρ ∈ [k/2, 2
3
k), then piC >
piD ⇔ qρ > (1+λ)hρ− 1
3
k. Thus, if h is sufficiently small, C will be optimal;
otherwise D is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Note that CD cannot be optimal due to Lemma 1. Comparing the profits
for D and C yields the following result:
Lemma 4 Let h > q and c < k. If c > 1
3
k, then piD > piC. If c ≤ 1
3
k, then
piD > piC iff c > 2
3
λhρ.
Proof. Suppose c ≥ k/2. Then the comparison of piD and piC shows that
piD > piC holds for all values of λhρ. Now, consider c < k/2. The comparison
of profits leads to three different cases. (1) If λhρ < c, then piD > piC is
always satisfied. (2) If c ≤ λhρ < k/2, then piD > piC ⇔ λhρ < 3
2
c. The
last inequality is satisfied under c ≤ λhρ < k/2 if 3
2
c > k
2
⇔ c > 1
3
k.
(3) If λhρ ≥ k/2, then piD > piC ⇔ c > 1
3
k. Thus, as long as c > 1
3
k,
decentralization leads to higher profits than centralization, but the same will
only be true for c ≤ 1
3
k if additionally λhρ < 3
2
c⇔ c > 2
3
λhρ holds.
Next, we can compare the profits for D and PD:
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Lemma 5 Let h > q and c < k. If c > 2
3
k, then piD > piPDk>c. If c ≤ 23k,
then piD > piPDk>c iff c >
2
3
λhρ.
Proof. When comparing piD and piPDk>c, we have to differentiate between
three cases: (1) If λhρ < c, then piD > piPDk>c always holds. (2) If c ≤ λhρ < k,
then piD > piPDk>c ⇔ λhρ < 32c. The last inequality is satisfied under c ≤
λhρ < k if 3
2
c > k ⇔ c > 2
3
k. (3) If λhρ ≥ k, then piD > piPDk>c ⇔ c > 23k.
To sum up, if c > 2
3
k then decentralization dominates partial delegation, but
the same is only true for c ≤ 2
3
k if λhρ satisfies λhρ < 3
2
c⇔ c > 2
3
λhρ.
Finally, we have to compare the profits for C and PD:
Lemma 6 Let h > q and c < k. If c > 1
3
k, then piPDk>c > pi
C. If c ≤ 1
3
k,
then piPDk>c > pi
C iff c > 2
3
λhρ or c > 2
3
k − 2
3
λhρ.
Proof. For c > 1
2
k, inequality piPDk>c > pi
C holds for all values of λhρ. Now,
suppose c ≤ 1
2
k. When comparing profits, we have do differentiate between
four constellations: (1) If λhρ < c, then piPDk>c > pi
C always holds. (2) If
c ≤ λhρ < k/2, then piPDk>c > piC ⇔ λhρ < 32c. The last inequality is always
satisfied under c ≤ λhρ < k/2 if 3
2
c > k
2
⇔ c > 1
3
k. (3) If k/2 ≤ λhρ < k,
then piPDk>c > pi
C ⇔ λhρ > k − 3
2
c. The last inequality is satisfied under
k/2 ≤ λhρ < k if k − 3
2
c < k/2 ⇔ c > 1
3
k. (4) If λhρ ≥ k, then piPDk>c > piC
always holds. Hence, if c > 1
3
k then partial delegation will yield higher
expected profits than centralization. For c ≤ 1
3
k, however, the same will only
be true if λhρ < 3
2
c⇔ c > 2
3
λhρ or if λhρ > k − 3
2
c⇔ c > 2
3
k − 2
3
λhρ.
Lemmas 4–6 together prove the results of Proposition 4, which in con-
nection with the result of Proposition 3(a) yield Figure 1.
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Proof of Proposition 5:
The comparison of profits for C and CD leads to the following observation:
Lemma 7 Let h < q and c < k. If c < 2
3
k, then piC > piCD. If c ≥ 2
3
k,
then piC > piCD iff λqρ < 2
3
k.
Proof. Given c < 1
2
k, the comparison of piC and piCD shows that piC >
piCD holds for all values of λqρ. For the comparison of profits under c ≥ 1
2
k,
we have to differentiate between three cases: (1) If λqρ < k/2, then piC > piCD
always holds. (2) If k/2 ≤ λqρ < c, then piC > piCD ⇔ λqρ < 2
3
k. The last
inequality is satisfied under k/2 ≤ λqρ < c if 2
3
k > c. (3) If λqρ ≥ c, then
piC > piCD ⇔ c < 2
3
k. Hence, if c < 2
3
k then centralization will yield higher
expected profits than concentrated delegation. For c ≥ 2
3
k, however, the
same will only be true if λqρ < 2
3
k.
Comparing piD and piPDk>c yields:
Lemma 8 Let h < q and c < k. If c > 2
3
k, then piD > piPDk>c. If c ≤ 23k,
then piD > piPDk>c iff λhρ <
3
2
c.
Proof. We have to differentiate between three cases: (1) If λhρ < c, then
piD > piPDk>c always holds. (2) If c ≤ λhρ < k, then piD > piPDk>c ⇔ λhρ < 32c.
The last inequality is satisfied under c ≤ λhρ < k if 3
2
c > k ⇔ c > 2
3
k. (3) If
λhρ ≥ k, then piD > piPDk>c ⇔ c > 23k. Thus, if c > 23k then decentralization
will dominate partial delegation. If c ≤ 2
3
k, the same will only hold if λhρ <
3
2
c.
Lemmas 7 and 8 show that CD (PD) is dominated by another organiza-
tional form if c < 2
3
k (c > 2
3
k). Thus, we do not have to compare CD and
PD with each other. Comparing the profits for C with those for PD and
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D, and comparing the profits for CD with those for D leads to the following
results:6
Lemma 9 Let h < q and c < k. If q−h is sufficiently large, then piC > piPDk>c
and piC > piD and piCD > piD.
First, consider result (a) of Proposition 5 with c < 2
3
k. In this situation,
CD cannot be optimal (Lemma 7). If q − h is large, piC > max{piPDk>c, piD}
(Lemma 9) so that C will be optimal. Result (b) refers to c ≥ 2
3
k. According
to Lemma 8, PD cannot be optimal. If q − h is large and therefore q is
large, then piCD > piC (Lemma 7). Since piCD > piD for large values of q − h
(Lemma 9), CD is optimal.
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Additional Material for the Referees
Proof of Lemma 9:
First, centralization is compared to partial delegation.
Suppose k/2 < c:
(1) If λhρ < c and λqρ < k/2:
piC > piPDk>c ⇔
(
1 +
2
3
λ
)
q >
(
1 +
5
6
λ
)
h.
(2) If λhρ < c and λqρ > k/2:
piC > piPDk>c ⇔ qρ >
(
1 +
5
6
λ
)
hρ− 1
3
k.
(3) If c < λhρ < k and λqρ > k/2:
piC > piPDk>c ⇔ qρ >
(
1 +
1
3
λ
)
hρ+
1
2
c− 1
3
k. (10)
(4) λhρ > k and λqρ > k/2:
piC > piPDk>c ⇔ qρ > hρ+
1
2
c.
Now, suppose k/2 > c: We find the same cases and conditions (1)–(4) as
under k/2 < c. However, there is the additional case that c < λhρ < k and
λqρ < k/2:
piC > piPDk>c ⇔
(
1 +
2
3
λ
)
qρ >
(
1 +
1
3
λ
)
hρ+
1
2
c.
Altogether, if q − h is sufficiently large, piC > piPDk>c will be satisfied.
Next, centralization is compared to decentralization.
Suppose k/2 < c:
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(1) If λhρ < c and λqρ < k/2:
piC > piD ⇔
(
1 +
2
3
λ
)
q > (1 + λ)h.
(2) If λhρ < c and λqρ > k/2:
piC > piD ⇔ qρ > (1 + λ)hρ− 1
3
k.
(3) If λhρ > c and λqρ > k/2:
piC > piD ⇔ qρ− c > hρ− 1
3
k. (11)
Now, suppose k/2 > c: We find the same cases and conditions (1)–(3) as
under k/2 < c. However, there is the additional case that λhρ > c and
λqρ < k/2:
piC > piD ⇔
(
1 +
2
3
λ
)
qρ− c > hρ.
Thus, if q − h is sufficiently large, piC > piD will be satisfied.
Finally, concentrated delegation is compared to decentralization:
(1) If λhρ < c and λqρ < c:
piCD > piD ⇔ (2 + λ) q > (2 + 2λ)h. (12)
(2) If λhρ < c and λqρ > c:
piCD > piD ⇔ 2qρ+ c > (2 + 2λ)hρ. (13)
(3) If λhρ > c and λqρ > c:
piCD > piD ⇔ 2qρ− c > 2hρ. (14)
If q − h is sufficiently large, piCD > piD will be satisfied in each of the three
cases.
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Construction of Figure 2:
The figure uses λ = ρ = 1/2 and λhρ = 3
4
k ⇒ h = 3k. Note that the
horizontal axis starts at q = h = 3k, since only values with q > h are
feasible.
First, consider c > k. Since PD is dominated by D (Lemma 2) and C
is dominated by CD (Lemma 3), only D and CD are candidate solutions in
this parameter region. Moreover, we have λhρ < c in the relevant range so
that (12) (i.e., q > (2 + 2λ)h/ (2 + λ)] = 3.6k) and (13) (i.e., c > 4.5k − q)
describe the solution.
For 2
3
k < c < k, again D and CD are the only candidate solutions since
C is dominated by CD (Lemma 7), and PD is dominated by D (Lemma
8). The solution for the interval λhρ < c < k is described by (13) (i.e.,
c > 4.5k − q), and the solution for 2
3
k < c < λhρ by (14) (i.e., c < q − 3k).
For 1
2
k < c < 2
3
k, the organizational form C dominates CD (Lemma 7)
and D dominates PD (Lemma 8; note that λhρ < 3
2
c⇔ c > k/2 is satisfied
here). Hence, either C or D is optimal. The respective solution is given by
condition (11) (i.e., c < q
2
− 7
6
k).
Finally, for c < 1
2
k, the form C dominates CD (Lemma 7), and PD
dominates D (Lemma 8; now λhρ > 3
2
c ⇔ c < k/2 holds). The comparison
between C and PD is described by (10) (i.e., c < q − 17
6
k).
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